However, Australia has also implemented successive rounds of autonomous sanctions against Iran since October 2008, beyond what was required by the UN. Each new round of sanctions has added new proscribed organisations/individuals, or has expanded the sanctions to other areas of trade. For example, the last round of autonomous sanctions, imposed in 2012, restricted trade in the hydrocarbon sector and introduced limitations on the bilateral trade in precious metals. Figure 2: The Australian sanctions regime Source: DFAT However, Australia’s sanctions regime never reached the extent of that imposed by the US, being more comparable to Europe’s.
Congress then has two months to decide whether to re-impose nuclear-related sanctions. If they decide to do so, then the US will be in violation of the deal. However, if the legislature makes no decision, the onus passes back to the President. [15] Policy positions Although President Trump and his administration have been broadly and consistently negative about the JCPOA, the administration’s comments on the deal have been contradictory and varied.
And, if Iran becomes a nuclear power, the West loses what ability it may currently have to shape Iran’s behaviour and mitigate against its other activities. Without a nuclear deal, Tehran can resume progress toward a nuclear weapon. Without the deal, any restrictions that block Tehran’s path to a bomb would be gone and international monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities would be lost. There is no other realistic achievable alternative to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. Only the US is looking to revisit the deal. The other JCPOA partners (UK, France, China, Russia, Germany) vigorously oppose ending the deal, and have warned that if the US withdraws they would be isolated on the issue.
The Australian Government approach Australian sanctions The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (DFAT) sanctions website notes that Australia has implemented successive rounds of UNSC and autonomous sanctions against Iran (see figure 2). Australia is required under international law to implement UNSC sanctions, and does so through the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 and associated regulations.
Former US President Barak Obama, who played a key role in negotiations, was clear from the outset about the limited aims of the JCPOA. It was not designed to address other aspects of Iranian policy or behaviour; rather, its singular goal was to cut off all avenues for Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. [4] The JCPOA’s architects also hoped it would be a foundation for rapprochement between Iran and the world, and that Iran’s interactions with the world would encourage other gradual changes in Iranian behaviour outside the nuclear program. In a July 2015 press conference, Obama addressed concerns that the deal was too limited in scope, noting:...
As such, not all these sanctions were lifted following the implementation of the JCPOA, leaving a large number in place. [8] Post-JCPOA UN Resolution 2231 (2015) was adopted by the UNSC on 20 July 2015. This endorsed the JCPOA and terminated the sanctions imposed under earlier UNSC resolutions. [9] The CRS notes that the suspended sanctions were mostly those imposed under UN resolution 1929 (2010) which targeted Iran’s civilian economic sectors. However, there is considerable variation in what sanctions remain imposed on Iran by different partners. For example, virtually all EU sanctions were lifted in 2015, with the exception of an embargo on the sale of arms and missile technology and other proliferation-sensitive items and equipment that could be used for internal repression. Russia and China only ever had UNSC sanctions in place, and these are now lifted.
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There is little likelihood of UN sanctions being reimposed if the US does not recertify Iranian compliance. Therefore, sanctions would only be reimposed by the US, and would arguably be less effective. Iran has little incentive or will to renegotiate the deal. No Iranian leader will be able to support a deal where they get less in return for less, and the US is unlikely to support a deal that gives Iran further concessions.
[5] However, the JCPOA’s proponents emphasise that the most important aspects of the agreement remain in perpetuity. As such, the existence of these clauses does not mean Iran can or will build a nuclear weapon the moment these limits expire. Ongoing components of the deal include continuous, comprehensive inspections and a permanent prohibition on Iran having a nuclear weapons program. [6] Iran also has to inform the IAEA when it decides to build a nuclear facility, and in 2023 it will ratify the IAEA’s additional protocol which allows short-notice inspections of undeclared facilities (until then, Iran is allowing these inspections voluntarily).
The President can also ‘hollow out’ sanctions lists by removing individuals and entities. As nuclear sanctions would be waived by the executive rather than repealed by the legislature, the White House argued that if Iran violates the agreement, the President can quickly ‘snap-back’ sanctions without legislative hurdles. See: Z Laub, ‘International sanctions on Iran’, backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2015. UN Ambassador Nikki Haley described the requirements of the Act in an address to the American Enterprise Institute in September. She noted that the law states the President must certify not only that Iran is complying with the agreement, but also that the provision by the US of continued sanctions relief is ‘appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program’ and ‘vital to the national security interests of the United States’.
[17] Addressing the UN in September this year, Iranian President Rouhani said ‘I declare to you the Islamic Republic of Iran will not be the first country to violate the agreement, but it will respond decisively and resolutely to its violation by any party’. The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, has also emphasised that protecting the nuclear deal is Tehran’s first priority, but noted Iran would not preserve the agreement at any price. He also warned that if others violated it, Iran could resume 20 per cent uranium enrichment within five days. The International Crisis Group has also noted that ‘no Iranian politician would be in a situation to accept a deal that is worse for Iran and better for the United States’.
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